September—October, 2008 (Vol. 23, No. 11-12)

Pentecostal women are gaining a new place in the politics of Kenya, both on an official and unofficial basis, according to Damaris Parsitau of Egerton University.

Parsitau, who was presenting a paper at the ASR meeting in Boston, said that Pentecostal female clergy in particular are moving into Kenyan public life and taking on new political roles. Many of these women are influenced by Bishop Margaret Wanjiru, who serves in Kenya’s Parliament. Wanjiru was the first women to be ordained a bishop in Kenya. Also influential on a more unofficial basis is Teresa Wairimu, a well-known evangelist, teacher and healer who has increasingly laced her sermons and “prophetic utterances” with social and political messages.

For instance, Wairimu has recently attacked tribal and ethnic clashes and corruption during elections. Wairimu and other women “use their public speaking in Pentecostalism to insert themselves in the public sphere,” Parsitau added. She noted that these female leaders and their women followers becoming involved in politics are often single and often face discrimination by male politicians. Women mentored by these leaders have engaged in a new wave of activism, even taking to the streets in protests.

These Pentecostal women have also formed political networks, which include men, that are “transferring the spirit to the public sphere,” Parsitau said.

Western countries apply their principles only when they suit their interests, and Russia should have the ability to resist attempts to make it subservient to the West, said Archpriest Vsevolod Chaplin, the deputy head of the Moscow Patriarchate Department for External Church Relations (DECR), in late August on a Russian television channel (Interfax, Sept. 2).

There have been a number of statements from Russian Orthodox public figures in recent years asserting Russia’s right to develop its own model, instead of adopting Western lifestyles or political and social models. In 2005, the influential DECR chairman, Metropolitan Kirill, had blessed the release of a “Russian Doctrine”, written by some 70 Orthodox conservative thinkers. They stated that Russia is entitled to its rightful place in the current world (dis)order and should at the same time strive to promote its “spiritual sovereignty,” proposing what they described as “tradition-based modernization.”

This cannot be reduced to a simple alignment along the Russian government’s lines: while such cooperation is strongly in evidence, the Russian Orthodox Church also attempts to put its own concerns forward. Several of its leading members see the Western model as morally flawed and tending toward materialism. Beside geopolitical concerns related to U.S.–European influence and the perceived need to counterbalance the trends toward global dominance by the West, the Moscow Patriarchate is also concerned about the spread of secularism in Europe.

At a dialogue meeting that took place on July 24 in Kiev (Ukraine) between representatives of the Orthodox Church and of the Europeans People’s Party (Christian Democrats), the secretary for church and society relations at the DECR, Fr. Georgy Ryabykh, claimed that the spirit of “aggressive secularism” in Western Europe was “similar to the Soviet course in [the] religious field,” though in a liberal variant (Interfax, July 31). Such views explain why some high-level churchmen in the DECR, while wary of alleged Roman Catholic penetration on Russian territory, have been proposing a “strategic alliance” with the Roman Catholic Church in order to counter secularizing trends in Europe.

A recent memorandum of understanding (MOU) signed Aug. 18 between the Shiite party Hezbollah and certain Salafist clerics from Tripoli in North Lebanon reveals the emergence of a new brand of Salafism, more independent of the local political scene and less focused on an exacerbated confessional discourse.

The MOU stands in contract with the process of radicalization of confessional identities in Lebanon after the 2006 Israeli war on Hezbollah. From Hezbollah’s point of view, the move is quite clear: establish new channels of influence inside the Sunni community in a context of hardening relations with its Islamic Sunni counterpart, the Jamaa Islamiyya. The situation is highly different for the Salafist groups, who are closely connected to the Future Current, Saudi Arabia’s and America’s ally, and who interact with a radicalized Sunni constituency still traumatized by the West Beirut takeover at the beginning of May by Hezbollah’s fighters.

This MOU has to be understood as the result of two processes: the crisis between this movement and the Future Current and the diversification of the Salafist movement in Lebanon. The relation between the Future and the Salafist leaders is suffering from two major points of tension. The first one is the incapacity of the Future Current to deliver, due to its weak influence on some of the security bodies in charge of the surveillance of radical Islamic groups, as promised in an informal deal during the parliamentary elections of 2005.

Secondly, despite its informal political alliance, the Future Current works to undermine Salafist groups’ influence by relying on clerical networks close to the Egyptian Islamic University of al-Azhar and by preparing to reinforce their alliance with the Islamic counterweight to the Salafist movement: the Jamaa Islamiyya, which is close to the Muslim Brother school of thought. This context of discontent about the ties between Salafists and the Future Current increased the internal polarization of the Salafist groups.

If the dominant trend, represented by the leadership of the al-Shahâl family, is still the key player among Lebanese Salafists, it is facing the expansion of a serious challenger: the Kuwait-supported Jama’iyya alIhiyya al-Turâth al-Islâmiy headed by Safwan al-Zoabi, a young dynamic religious entrepreneur who wants to reform the Salafist experience. His goals are twofold: to go beyond mere teaching of religious principles and develop a new presence in the social field through expanding development-oriented local initiatives.

This new Salafist current was able to capitalize on the internal divisions and conflicts inside the historical wing directed by Dai Islam alShahal. It disagrees with its radical confessional orientation and believes in the necessity of dialogue with its Shiite counterparts— with Hezbollah not least among them. The memorandum was quickly frozen after heavy Saudi pressure. Still, it is a new blow to the Future Current’s domination of the Sunni community a few months before the parliamentary elections of 2009, where the formal domination on the political system might switch from Sunni to Shiite hands, a first in Lebanon’s history.

— By Patrick Haenni

Since the several attempts to establish the Wasat party as an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood since 1997, innovation inside the Islamic organization seemed to be guided by a liberal, even a democratic, spirit.

But this tendency is now being reversed by the assertion of a strong conservative Salafist current inside the organization. Traditionally, Egyptian Salafism often developed outside and as a rival (sometimes state-supported) to the Muslim Brothers. During what has been called the “Cairo spring,” the emergence of serious American pressure on the Egyptian regime to open up the political system and the appearance of an Islamic blogosphere contesting the old guard hegemony and criticizing a martial, authoritarian militant culture gave the impression that the trajectory of the Muslim Brothers might be moving towards a more liberal stance.

This seems now to have been an illusion. A liberal trend exists through the alliance of political democrats (Abdel Meneim Abou al-Futûh being the unique representative of this group among the Guidance Office, the executive body leading the organization) and a new generation of militants searching for a “downsized” political organization that was less authoritarian and capable of granting some space for individual autonomy. But it is not on the rise anymore, neither at the elite level, nor at the level of the rank and file.

Four factors explain this stagnation: first of all, the liberals need a certain level of political openness; secondly they are more exposed than Salafism to political repression (more strict in religious terms, but less keen to get involved in politics); thirdly, they mobilize on a discourse of openness (among non-Islamic actors inside Egyptian society; among non-Islamic categories at a conceptual level), but this openness is not based on an ideological aggorniamento; and, last but not least, they lack the financial support that their rivals inside the organization have.

— By Patrick Haenni, senior researcher, Religioscope Institute

Urban congregations are increasingly redeveloping their property for profit, and in the process are forming new partnerships with secular organizations, as well as changing the way they interact with their own members, according to new research.

At the Association for the Sociology of Religion (ASR) meeting in Boston in August, which RW attended, Nadia Mian of the New School presented a study of congregations in New York City that have become more entrepreneurial by engaging in property development. While churches and other religious organizations have been involved in property and housing development for decades, “presently, more and more churches are selling their air rights and property to developers in various schemes that result in housing, commercial and retail projects, “ according to Mian. In her research, which is published in the September issue of Urban Studies Journal, she counted at least 30 different real estate projects involving congregations in New York.

“The trend continues, as one developer working with a church will seek out more churches to partner with, in order to gain access to scarce property in Manhattan.” Mian added that this trend is also evident in other American cities. Religious institutions involved in real estate tend to move in two directions—towards market-rate condominiums/commercial property or affordable/senior housing. Although religious organizations can act independently, most partner either with other religious or secular groups (such as a corporation or government), implying new forms of cooperation.

These congregations tend to learn from one another, and through sharing “information and even resources, they begin to act in ways that are cooperative as opposed to individualistic. Pastors interact with other churches in the community to share knowledge about the development process, architects, finances and other issues,” Mian writes.

She adds, however, that in such projects “there is a lack of emphasis on and consideration of preservation and historical conservation efforts” (especially since landmarking status tends to make reconstruction difficult). Another pitfall that Mian finds among congregations is that as churches become more entrepreneurial (and take on additional real estate projects), they drive away the people they are trying to help, losing congregants as the community becomes gentrified and too expensive.

Ex-Muslims who have become Christians are increasingly forming a movement of “Muslim-background believers” in North America, reports Christianity Today (September).

While there are few reliable figures for the number of ex-Muslims who have converted to Christianity, either in their home countries or in the U.S. and Canada, there are at least 50 organizations that seek to minister to such believers. Some of these converts have tried to integrate themselves into American congregations, but the feeling of being a minority has led these new believers to find community often in “reclusive urban groups of 10– 20 believers.” Last fall, Muslim-background believers’ leaders convened at conferences and summits in Toronto, Detroit, Indianapolis, Atlanta, Dallas, and Washington, DC.

But many of these fellowships are fragile and prone to schism and dissolution, writes Christopher Lewis. These struggles over leadership and ethnic tensions are most evident in the more diverse Arab and Asian groups. In New York City, more than 10 groups have folded in one generation. Many ex-Muslim Christians are “loners,” either marginalized in American congregations or relying on the Internet for their spiritual needs.

There is more stability in the monolithic Iranian churches, which are the most numerous and organized, and are linked (however unofficially) with a growing underground evangelical movement in Iran. But it was only recently that Iranian congregations have been organized and united enough to plant other congregations in the U.S., through the California-based Iranian Christian Church (ICC). The ICC has also established an international television ministry that links believers to their counterparts in Iran.

(Christianity Today, 465 Gundersen Dr., Carol Stream, IL 60188)

The 2008 U.S. election was supposed to be different than the previous presidential races, at least when it came to religion and politics.

This was the case for the Democrats especially, as the party made early strides to engage religious, even evangelical voters, and close the “faith gap”. Meanwhile, 2008 was the year in which the “new evangelicals” would make their political debut, stressing conciliatory issues, such as the environment, rather than rehashing the culture wars. But according to new polls and seasoned observers, the 2008 election may turn out to be very similar to the contentious 2004 election.

At the mid-September meeting of the Religion Newswriters Association in Washington, DC, which RW attended, religion and politics specialist John Green presented a new survey showing that the basic patterns set in 2004 still hold: evangelicals are the most supportive of McCain, just as they were of George W. Bush, and Barack Obama has made few inroads into the evangelical community. The political configurations of mainline, Catholic and non-affiliated Americans are also similar to 2004. But some surprising changes were revealed in the survey, which was conducted in the summer of 2008.

For one thing, Hispanic Catholics and Protestants swerved back to a Democratic preference after showing some Republican sympathy in 2004. There was also a shift among all respondents toward stressing economic rather than social and foreign policy issues, especially among “traditionalist Catholic” voters. In fact, it is the way in which these pressing economic matters can be addressed by religious values that may be decisive for voters from many faith groups, Green added. Since Green found, somewhat to his surprise, that Obama had as little impact among evangelicals as John Kerry had in the 2004 election in his summer poll, than it might be expected that the selection of fellow evangelical Sarah Palin as McCain’s running mate would solidify that pattern.

A new survey by the Pew Research Center released during the conference does show that, among all groups, it was the evangelicals who became the most favorable toward McCain as a result of the Palin selection. The percentage of voters saying that they back McCain strongly climbed from 17 percent in August to 25 percent currently, with the strongest growth being among white evangelical Protestants and Catholics. In fact, 27 percent of white evangelical supporters of McCain say they almost wish Palin could be the presidential nominee.

Meanwhile, Amy Sullivan, a writer for Time magazine, had to revise her optimistic view of young evangelicals serving as a Democratic vanguard. Sullivan, who has written books and advised candidates on the evangelical political change, admitted at the conference that events since last summer, especially starting with the conventions, sent many evangelical voters back to the 2004 mindset. The significant drop in Republican identification among young evangelicals, declining from 52 percent in 2004 to 40 percent in 2008, may have meant that they were becoming independent or undecided rather than going to Obama.

Even before the Republican convention, there were signs of retrenchment among evangelicals. Sullivan said that Rick Warren, seen as an important representative of the new centrist evangelicals, appeared to pull back from his advocacy of non-culture war issues (the environment, world poverty) during his forum where he interviewed Obama and McCain. Sullivan added that Warren had come under pressure and criticism from more conservative evangelicals to return to a focus on culture war issues, such as abortion, gay marriage and embryonic stem cell research. On the Democratic side, there has been a similar movement of retrenchment.

The attempt to moderate pro-choice language at the Democratic convention—seen in a minor change to the party’s platform to work to prevent unwanted pregnancies—has been rolled back as significant elements in the party have attacked the prolife policies of McCain and Palin. Sullivan concluded that while Obama hired religion advisors, his campaign never gave them many resources on the ground; since the convention, the campaign has “cut the budget in their religious outreach.” If Democrats lose in November, there will be pressure to further downplay the appeal to religious voters, Sullivan speculates.