March—April, 2013 (Vol. 28, No. 5-6)

There is increasing division between Orthodox and progressive Jews in Poland over the matter of who will represent the Jewish community in the country, according to the Jerusalem Report (February 25).

The magazine reports that there is an “internecine battle for power and prestige—and the vast control of funds” between the Polish Orthodox community represented by Twarda (named for the street the organization is located on in Warsaw) and Beit Polska of the progressive Jewish community, writes Nissan Tzur. In 2008 Beit Polska requested and received from the Polish Interior Ministry recognition as the umbrella organization of progressive Jews. In response, the Union of Jewish Religious Communities, which was until then the only Jewish community recognized by the Polish government, appealed to have the decision overturned, claiming that by law it had the monopoly as the umbrella organization for all Jewish groups in Poland.

Twarda claimed that the union also represented the progressive stream of Judaism and demanded to be a part of the Beit Polska’s registration. For its part, Beit Polska and its founder Severyn Ashkenazy charge that Twarda’s leaders are concerned about having to share the government subsidies it receives with the progressive community. Ashkenazy adds that the Orthodox community has been selling off assets from abandoned Jewish properties that have been transferred to the Jewish community by the government and there is little transparency about where this money has gone.

To complicate the situation even more, Twarda recently formed a new progressive congregation to show that both streams of Judaism can coexist. Beit Polska claims that the move is merely a façade and that the real issue is Twarda’s opposition to Jewish pluralism and its desire to maintain its monopoly. There have been attempts to settle the dispute by outside Jewish leaders, but little progress has been made.

(Jerusalem Report, http://thejerusalemreport.wordpress.com/)

The shift from “bricks and mortar” campuses to virtual classrooms is being actively pursued by a large segment of American theological seminaries, reports the Christian Century (Feb. 20).

As with radio and TV broadcasting, it seems that evangelical seminaries are the most heavily invested in the new learning technology, which could range from a few courses being offered online to new distance learning programs aiming for an international following. One leader in offering online courses is evangelical Gordon-Conwell Seminary, which started a program that allows students to take up to a third of their degree requirements in “self-paced courses.”

Fuller Seminary has expanded its international reach, offering online courses to students in Asia, Africa, Latin America and Europe. In response to the fast growth of online programs in seminaries, the Association of Theological Schools will decide this summer whether to accredit Masters of Divinity programs in which more than two-thirds of their courses are presented online.

The evangelical Association for Biblical Higher Education already does so, writes Lawrence Wood. In one sense, the importance of fostering community in seminaries, where prayer and learning together is a priority, might be a mitigating factor in adopting virtual classrooms. Yet seminaries have long offered distant learning in one form or another for part-time students. Leading mainline liberal seminaries have been resistant to the trend. Union, Yale, Harvard and Duke offer no or few online courses, which may pose difficulties, since they have the highest tuitions (Union costs $44,000 per year). Wood concludes that “Perhaps the next step for seminaries is to deliver academic resources directly to congregations.”

Luther Seminary, for instance, already offers several long-form webinars for congregational leaders that resemble degree programs.

(Christian Century , 407 S. Dearborn St., Chicago, IL 60605)

While much remains to be seen regarding the leadership style and priorities of Pope Francis, the themes of the challenge of secularization and evangelization figure prominently in many analyses and forecasts of the new papacy.

The shifting distribution of world Catholicism formed the context of most of the coverage of Pope Francis’s election. The facts are familiar: two-thirds of Catholics used to live in Europe a century ago: there are only 25 percent today, and this figure should be down to 20 percent by 2050, although the special role of Europe should continue, if only for historical reasons and due to the location of the Holy See there. But more than 40 percent of the entire Catholic population resides in Latin America.

Growth over the past century has been the fastest in Africa. For the future, observers look toward Asia, with a big question mark about the potential for growth in China. A pope from Europe is necessarily and acutely aware of the challenge of secularization. Writing in the Christian Science Monitor (March 14), G. Jeffrey MacDonald notes that most observers expect the new pope to vigorously champion the “new evangelization,” which involves bringing lapsed and inactive Catholics (and new converts) back into church life. Pope Francis’s election comes at a time when Catholics in the U.S. and abroad are searching for ways to reverse the sharp dropout rate in the church, particularly among young people.

In an article on the First Things website (March 25), neoconservative Catholic theologian George Weigel reports that the new pope “played a significant role in shaping the Latin American bishops’ 2007 ‘Aparecida Document,’ which embraced the New Evangelization and put it at the center of the church’s life.” Weigel adds that in conversations with the future pope last year, the latter stressed that the idea of a “kept church—kept in the sense of legal establishment, cultural habit or both—had no future in the twenty-first-century West, given the acids of secularism.”

Secularization is not absent in Latin America (see article on Secularization and culture wars gain currency in Latin America), but the level of religious practice is significantly higher and a pope coming from that continent is likely to look at things in a different way, as has already become obvious (no doubt also for reasons linked to the personal style and sensitivities of Pope Francis).

While liberation theology is no longer what it used to be, it has left an impact on Latin American Catholicism. Even sectors of Catholicism hostile to Liberation Theology (this would include Fr. Bergoglio at the time he was head of the Jesuits in Argentina) tend to have an acute awareness of social problems such as poverty. While some evangelicals were initially wary about a South American pope, due to the strong competition with Catholics in that part of the world, the approach of Pope Francis, his simplicity and his emphasis on basic Biblical teachings seem to have dissipated initial questions.

While sometimes faced with secularist politicians, the Catholic Church had long enjoyed a quasi monopoly in South America. The rapid growth of evangelical groups (both imported and, subsequently, increasingly indigenous ones) has changed the situation: in four Latin American countries, more than 30 percent of the population is now Protestant: the figure is 25 percent in Brazil, 9 percent in Argentina.

However, although this created a kind of panic among leaders of the Roman Catholic Church, there have also been dynamic Catholic responses, including the charismatic renewal, which spread during the 1970s, with a varied impact from one country to another.

Today, more than 16 percent of Latin American Catholics identity themselves as charismatics, according to Rodney Stark and Buster G. Smith in an article in Latin American Politics and Society (summer 2012). This has encouraged a strong involvement of lay people in the church. Moreover, Latin American charismatics often develop a concern for social issues as well, and not only for evangelization and faith renewal, writes Henri Gooren in the journal Pneuma (34/2).

(First Things , http://www.firstthings.com; Latin American Politics and Society,  http://www.as.miami.edu/clas/publications/laps; Pneuma, http://www.brill.com/pneuma.)

Israel is experiencing a “secularization below the radar,” according to Guy Ben-Porat, a political scientist at Ben-Gurion University at a March seminar at Columbia University in New York attended by RW.

Ben-Porat, whose presentation was based on his new book, Between State and Synagogue (Cambridge University Press), said that even though Israel may not separate church and state and many Israelis may retain their strong religious attachments, religious and rabbinical authority is declining in Israel because of demographic and consumerist changes. In this process, secular and non-orthodox Israelis are finding novel ways to skirt laws and observances involving the Sabbath, kosher food, and marriage.

Ben-Porat added that many of these changes are “not on the books or official” and are not related to promoting a secular ideology or engaging in politics. In the 1980s and 1990s many secular Israelis reacted to the growing influence of Orthodox Jewish political parties with a political strategy or by appealing to the liberal Supreme Court. Yet such efforts were largely unsuccessful in challenging Orthodox influence, according to Ben-Porat. Secular and non-Orthodox Israelis have done better by creating their own “comfort zone” in a religious state through an entrepreneurial approach, with some help from broader demographic changes.

The influx of immigrants from the former Soviet Union (FSU) during the last two decades has added to Israel’s secular climate, since many of these newcomers are defined as non-Jewish by the Orthodox (largely because of having non-Jewish mothers). Since their marriages cannot be certified by Orthodox authorities, many of these FSU Israelis citizens go to Cyprus to have their wedding ceremonies. “Secular entrepreneurs”—those who use the available resources to circumvent religious regulations—open businesses on the Sabbath by using the loophole of that allows non-Jewish merchants to work and thus keep their shops open.

The expansion of shopping malls outside cities that are outside of the religious regulations regarding the Sabbath and kosher food is also encouraged by the consumer lifestyle of secular Israelis. This lifestyle may be spreading, as Ben-Porat cited research showing that as much as 40 percent of Israelis who define themselves as “traditional” also admit to shopping on the Sabbath. In the same way, non-kosher food can be produced and sold if the producer or vendor is non-Jewish, thus allowing for an alternative secular market.

The bending of the rules and the other ways in which secular Israelis get around religious authority tend to “take away the political energy for fighting.” There is also a “disinclination for the orthodox party to fight beyond their own turf,” thus decreasing the chances of a major “culture war” between the religious and seculars in Israel, according to Ben-Porat.

In comparison with other European countries, Poland still exhibits a high level of religious beliefs and attendance at religious services; but while criticism of the Catholic Church was associated with Communism in the 1990s, it is no longer the case with the younger generation. This is especially true for those linked to the new left, which associates church criticism with wider social and political discussions, writes Cezary Koscielniak in Religion & Gesellschaft (February).

Until he passed away in 2005, Pope John Paul II had a special meaning for most Poles: they tended to see him as their leader; even the party of the former Communists had enthusiastically welcomed him during his 1999 visit to the Polish Parliament. The signing of a Concordat between the state and the Holy See in 1993 seemed to be self-evident, allowing for wide control of the church in matters of confessional religious teachings and theological departments at state universities.

Only today, 20 years later, does the political opposition question its provisions. In the political sphere, two secular-oriented movements are active: firstly, the party of the former Communists (27 seats), although it has avoided letting frictions within the Catholic Church lead to open confrontation. Secondly, the Palikot movement obtained 40 seats in the 2011 elections: one of its main goals is to put an end to the special position of the Roman Catholic Church (including banning religious teaching at state schools).

Palikot members are aggressively anticlerical, staging, for instance, demonstrations supporting “debaptization.” Interestingly, its leader used to be an active Catholic (and even the publisher of a Catholic weekly) a few years earlier. Yet recent surveys indicate that the Palikot movement would probably no longer manage to gain seats in Parliament if elections were held today. According to Koscielniak, for most Polish citizens, religious questions do not take a central place, especially at a time of economic difficulties.

On the one hand, despite full churches, it is difficult for the Catholic Church to convince Poles to follow its moral rules. But, on the other hand, there is a network of charitable and educational Catholic institutions that are valued even by non-believers: few would want to put an end to those services. A current of “national Catholicism,” mixing religion and politics, remains strong in Poland. But today most people would not accept a priest in political office, and political statements from bishops have little real impact.

Christianity is alive and well in Poland, but the progress of political secularization cannot be denied.Meanwhile, a study by sociologist Lukasz Kutylo suggests that the steady decline in participation in the Catholic Church in Poland may be more because of dissatisfaction with the church and its political role than a loss of religious belief or secularization. In an article in the Interdisciplinary Journal of Religious Research (Volume 9, Article 2), Kutylo writes that there is a growing gap between the percentage of Poles who believe in God and the percentage who take part in religious services.

He finds that the percentage of Poles who believe in God in both Polish surveys and the European Values Survey has changed little; in 1997, 61 percent said they believe in God without any doubts; in 2009 this percentage was only one point lower. Kutylo finds that parish offerings (such as pilgrimages and youth activities) became less attractive to churchgoers between 2005 and 2008, and argues that the church is increasingly perceived as a bureaucratic institution and less as a community that unites its members.

(Interdisciplinary Journal of Religious Research, http://www.religjournal.com)

Several articles in the latest issue of the French journal of future studies Futuribles (March) deal with the social and political impact of religions; three of them focus on the European situation.

Pierre Bréchon (Institute for Political Studies, Grenoble) notes how Europe remains strongly divided among different historical forms of Christianity. Despite obvious changes, there is little mobility across religious affiliations: most people remain (more or less strongly) linked to inherited religious traditions (with odd cases, especially the Czech Republic, with low religious belonging). There are people who profess atheism and reject religion entirely, but they are a minority (around 9 percent in Western Europe; up to 18 percent in France). The results of the European Values Study (2008), which covered 46 countries, show the impact of religious affiliation and religiosity on values.

For instance, Muslims and Orthodox are much more attached to traditional moral and family values. At the opposite end of the spectrum are people who no longer identify with a religion (27 percent at the European level, in strong progression) and tend to be quite liberal, with a profile close to European Protestants in some aspects. However, if one considers not only religious affiliation, but the intensity of religious beliefs, it appears that different religions have similar effects on their members: strong believers of all religious traditions tend on average to support more strongly traditional values than people with less intense beliefs.

Thus it appears that both the religious culture of a country and the level of religiosity are the most important factors for predicting social and political attitudes. Regarding church–state relations in Europe, Philippe Portier (Paris-Sorbonne University) notes that three different models can be observed in different countries across Europe: some give a privileged status to one or two religious groups; others have a flexible model of church–state separation; and some have introduced strict church–state separation.

According to Portier, however, legal developments pertaining to different aspects of religion may lead to more similar approaches across European countries, despite different national legacies. In the long-run the result may be somewhere in the middle. On the one hand, writes Portier, in countries where a privileged status is given to one (or more) religion, a process of secularization seems bound to lead to more separation between the political and religious spheres, as well as to create openings for other religious groups: state religion is unlikely to be the way of the future. On the other hand, in countries with a strict church–state separation, such as France, despite an emphasis on issues such as the ban on religious symbols at schools, less visible steps have paved the way for “reassociation:” for instance, financial support for some Catholic (and later also Jewish and Muslim) schools, or indirect subsidies through tax deductions for renovating places of worship.

It remains to be seen how this can really create a common ground. (The potential impact of legal decisions at the European level for creating converging approaches, e.g. rulings of the European Court of Human Rights, is not considered in the article.)Regarding Islam in Western Europe, Franck Fregosi (Institute for Political Studies, Aixen-Provence) reminds that the religion currently represents 4.5 percent of the population and should reach 7.1 percent in 2030.

He remarks that identity-based reactions against Islam are widespread in Europe. Islam is, however, a fragmented reality showing ethnic, national and linguistic cleavages, but also generational and ideological divisions: the whole range of options is present. But with more and more Muslims holding European citizenships (nearly half of the 4.7 million Muslims in France are now French citizens), Islam is bound to become “indigenous.” According to Fregosi, this will go along with more and more Muslims in Europe climbing up the social ladder and becoming better educated.

(Futuribles, 47 rue de Babylone, 75007 Paris, France, http://www.futuribles.com)

Religion in Latin America appears to be taking on some aspects of European secularity and U.S. culture wars, according to two reports.

In the Christian Century (March 12), historian Phillip Jenkins writes that increasingly several countries in Latin America show a drift in religious affiliation and values that bear some similarity to the U.S. and even Europe. Jenkins acknowledges that there are conflicting signs about the vitality of religion in most Latin American countries. A country such as Brazil has experienced a Pentecostal upsurge, but at the same time there is a growth of the non-affiliated (up to nine percent), with the percentage of “nones” being highest among those under 20.

Jenkins writes that several Latin American countries’ liberalizing family patterns, seen in their falling fertility rates to below replacement levels (including Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, and in the near future Argentina), mirror this trend in secular Europe. Likewise, the advance of gay marriage (already legal in Argentina and likely to be accepted soon in Uruguay and Brazil) and pro-choice policies on abortion (al-though this is a more mixed picture) suggests that churches may soon be engaging “rear-guard actions” to fight such liberal reforms.

Jenkins adds that countries such as Colombia and Brazil are a long way from European secularization, but “we can foresee the emergence of a triangular political setup involving Pentecostals, Catholics and secularists and a constantly shifting balance of coalitions and alliances.” The issues surrounding gay marriage and abortion in Brazil have increasingly taken on the tone of American-style “culture wars”—both among the secular left and the evangelical right.

Public Eye (Winter), a left-of-center newsletter that monitors the religious and political right, reports that the American Center for Law and Justice (ACLJ) has recently opened a Brazilian branch after opening offices in Eastern Europe and Africa. Along with supporting human rights and religious freedom, the ACLJ has sought to defend the rights of Christians in terms of pro-life and anti-gay rights activism.

The opening of the center takes place at a time when the Brazilian gay rights movement has taken the offensive in promoting a bill that would make “homophobia,” or discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity, an aggravating factor in hate crimes, assaults, and hate speech. While many Latin American evangelicals lean left, even on issues like gay rights (compared to U.S. evangelicals), they have viewed the anti-discrimination movement as a threat to their freedom of expression and religious freedom in preaching on homosexuality and other controversial issues—one reason why the ACLJ branch has been formed. Writer Jandira Queiroz notes that that both sides of the conflict over gay rights in Brazil accuse each other of undue U.S. influence.

(Public Eye, 1310 Broadway, Suite 201, Somerville, MA 02144)

The Straight Edge movement, a subset of punk rock that stresses abstinence from drugs, alcohol and casual sex, may appear decidedly secular with an antagonistic view towards organized religion, but religious symbols and, on a lesser level, ideas “have remained rife within the subculture,” writes Francis Stewart in the journal Implicit Religion (Volume 15, Number 3).

The spiritual interest in the Straight Edge subculture can be seen in the songs and album covers of such bands as Throwdown, Good Clean Fun, and Stretch Arm Band, as well as in graffiti and tattoos. When interviewing 83 Straight Edge punks in the U.S. and UK, Stewart found numerous arguments and discussions about religion and spirituality. He notes that religion has become more pronounced since the 1990s with the influx of Christianity and Hare Krishna bands and ideology into Straight Edge circles, with some adherents mixing and matching different teachings.

Only two of the respondents from Stewart’s interviews identified as atheist, and five belonged to a traditional religion. Almost 30 percent of participants were involved in explicit religious practices, often including Dharma Punx, Krishnacore (variants of Buddhism and Hare Krishna), while a similar group of Straight Edgers embrace Taqwacore, which blends Islam with a punk rock sensibility. Krishnacore, founded by Straight Edge band leader Ray Cappo, was appealing because of its ascetic demands (especially for those accepting vegetarianism and veganism)—which became so popular that many worried that Hare Krishna was proselytizing Straight Edgers.

While Krishnacore’s appeal has waned in recent years, Dharma Punx, founded in the early 2000s by Noah Levine, has gained a following and tends to mix various strands of Buddhism with aspects of Hinduism, Sufism, paganism and liberal Christianity. Dharma Punx groups exist in a number of states, running meditation sessions and retreats. Others see Straight Edge itself as an implicit religion or spiritual path that might include going to concerts and the devotion of fans to their favorite bands, and the commitment to a selfdenying lifestyle (once they “break edge” and leave the lifestyle, they are never accepted back).

(Implicit Religion, http://www.equinoxpub.com)

Evangelicals are holding Christian versions of bar mitzvahs as part of a larger trend of increasing identification with Jews and Israel.

The New York Times Magazine (March 24) reports that the concept of the Christian bar mitzvah is carried out regardless of ethnicity and is seen as a Christ-centered coming of age ceremony. The boys are prepared for the ceremony by learning Hebrew and the scriptures, often under the guidance of a Messianic Jewish leader. The rabbis interviewed are divided on the practice, with some taking a tolerant attitude toward such borrowing, especially as it is accompanied by support for Israel, and others viewing it as poaching on the Jewish religion.

The article notes that for the past two decades, evangelicals have borrowed traditions and trappings of Judaism—from holding seders to being married under chuppahs and wearing prayer shawls over their clothes.

While much has been written about growing conflict and distance between Orthodox and more liberal expressions of Judaism, there is actually more contact between Orthodox and non-Orthodox Jews today because of the former’s practice of outreach to those outside the fold, writes Jack Wertheimer in Commentary magazine (April).

Orthodox outreach, or “kiruv,” began in the U.S. after World War II, but especially intensified with the Hasidic Chabad movement in the 1990s. The movement runs everything ranging from early childhood pro-grams to Hebrew schools, campus organizations and the largest adult education system on Jewish topics in the world, most of which seek to reach out to Jews of all stripes. There has also been an explosion of kiruv work from non-Hasidic “ultra-Orthodox” or “heredi” yeshivas, such as with the Aish Ha-Torah.

This organization runs seminars on leading a Jewish life with locations in 20 cities and many college campuses. Haredi rabbis usually devote their work both to their own continuing education and to leading study groups for Jewish residents in their communities.Wertheimer estimates that there are as many as 3,000–7,000 men and women working full-time in outreach to non-Orthodox Jews. While many kiruv workers aim to turn non-practicing and non-Orthodox Jews into observant and Orthodox ones, many take a more pragmatic approach, finding that increasing Jewish knowledge and some form of practice are the more realistic outcomes of their work.

These more modest goals are partly a result of the shrinking pool of potential converts to Orthodoxy: conservative Jews have been the most likely to convert to Orthodox Judaism, but since the 1990s this movement has shrunk demographically. Today’s complex Jewish situation of mixed families from interfaith marriages (having non-Jewish mothers) has also made conversion to Orthodoxy more difficult.

While kiruv workers receive criticism from mainstream Jewish groups for sheep stealing and from Orthodox quarters for too close contact with the “heterodox,” Wertheimer sees outreach as expanding the menu of Jewish learning in most communities, as well as making possible some rapprochement between the Orthodox and non-Orthodox sectors of American Judaism.

“Individuals who have little contact with organized Jewish life are turned on to Judaism by kiruv workers and in many cases find their way into non-Orthodox synagogues and secular organizations.”

(Commentary, 561 7th Avenue, 16th Floor, New York, NY 10018)

Historic mainline Protestant and Catholic churches are being recycled by evangelical congregations, even as many of their features are being retained by church planters who see their heritage and “authenticity” as a draw to younger members, reports Christianity Today (March).

Recent acquisitions of buildings by prominent evangelical congregations have tended to be historic mainline churches, such as Seattle’s Mars Hill megachurch obtaining the downtown First United Methodist. These acquisitions may signal a cultural shift in thinking about worship and finances, ac-cording to Gary Nicholson, director of Lifeway Architecture.

He adds that congregations that renovate old buildings or lease office or warehouse space are part of the same trend of “leveraging facilities more wisely by acquiring rather than constructing.” The trend is consistent with recent data from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis showing a nearly $5 billion drop in monthly construction spending on religious institutions. One pastor says that the 19th-century pews and vintage fixtures of the vacated Presbyterian church it bought appeal to young worshippers, who may have a subconscious feeling that “This is what it’s supposed to be like.”

(Christianity Today, 364 Gundersen, Carol Stream, IL 60188)

Cable television has been featuring religious themed shows for a while, but the long-standing con-cern among producers that religion is too controversial is giving way to a recognition that viewers enjoy learning about the history and role of faith in peoples’ lives.

The Hollywood Reporter (March 22) notes several series on cable television that are drawing high ratings, particularly the mini-series, “The Bible” on the History Channel and Lifetime’s reality show “Preachers’ Daughters,” which showed a 13 percent in-crease in viewers (1.7 million) from the first to the second episodes, not to mention the several popular shows on the Amish and Mennonite lifestyle.

Some producers see such programming as inspirational in nature, while others recognize the value of controversy in their productions. Such is the case with Showtime’s upcoming thriller series, “The Vatican,” which “incorporates spirituality, power and politics … set against the modern-day political machinations within the Catholic Church,” writes Kimberly Nordyke.

There was a concern that such shows might generate too much controversy among the faithful, but “what people are discovering is that viewers can distinguish entertainment from real life. Religion is of great interest to everyone, and a key driver of political and personal life worldwide. Maybe the curse came off it somehow that people would stay away” from religious-themed program-ming, says Paul Attanasio, the writer of “The Vatican.” It isn’t only reality and scripted programming that are using religious themes. GSN network scored a hit with its game show “The American Bible Challenge,” which tests contestants’ biblical knowledge and even spawned an online Bible study program by the network. Along with the greater willingness to broach controversial topics is a concern about not offending the faith groups that are portrayed or covered in these series, making fact checking, research and the use of consultants necessary.